The Foresight Institute on Arms Control and International Security: Guidelines v. 4.0

From Wise Nano

The Foresight Institute on Arms Control and International Security

Comment on the Foresight Guidelines Version 4.0

Mark Avrum Gubrud

Oct. 22, 2004

FI's position on arms control and nanotechnology has been headed in a clear direction since the organization's founding by K. Eric Drexler and Christine Peterson in 1986. Drexler's Engines of Creation portrayed a coming "assembler breakthrough" which would abruptly provide vast increases in military power. This 'ultimate weapon' view of ANT (in the MNT vision) has been reflected in Foresight's presentations and popular views of the subject ever since. It tends toward the recommendation that military use and development of nanotechnology should be unrestricted at least for the present, emphasizing defenses, since we're the good guys, but in any case getting the weapons before the bad guys do. This is an arms race-promoting, anti-arms control policy.

"The threat of advanced technology in the hands of governments makes one thing perfectly clear: we cannot afford to have an oppressive state take the lead in the coming breakthroughs." - K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation (1986)

Drexler proposed that a coalition of "the democracies" presumably led by the US should aggressively pursue the development of MNT and its "defensive" applications.

"Some force in the world (whether trustworthy or not) will take the lead in developing assemblers; call it the 'leading force'….To simplify matters, pretend for the moment that we (the good guys, attempting to be wise) can make policy for the leading force. For citizens of democratic states, this seems a good attitude to take."

Drexler proposed, but did not extensively discuss, "active shields" as a rubric for superautomated weapons systems. Combining all the resources of ANT and AAI, the shields would evolve and improve themselves primarily by simulating the wars they would hopefully deter. Drexler notes that biological evolution and the immune system depend on the constant testing of combat:

"Building and improving prototype shields will be akin to running both sides of an arms race on a laboratory scale."

This does not sound quite like perpetual peace. In fact, it requires endlessly simulating both sides of a war, whether in physical or virtual battlespaces. No reason is given to expect a convergence to some steady-state arsenal or peace shield. Rather, Drexler notes that

"A stable balance seems too much to hope for."

Not surprisingly, this logic of unilateralism and insecurity leads to a recommendation for preventive war to pacify the world before implementing a pax nanotechnica (Americana?).

"It would be hard to predict the outcome of an open-ended arms race between powers equipped with replicating assemblers. But before this situation can arise, the leading force seems likely to acquire a temporary but overwhelming military advantage. If the outcome of an arms race is in doubt, then the leading force will likely use its strength to ensure that no opponents are allowed to catch up. If it does so, then active shields will not have to withstand attacks backed by the resources of half a continent or half a solar system; they will instead be like a police force or an immune system, facing attacks backed only by whatever resources can be gathered in secret within the protected territory."

The vision is not of a world government, but rather a system of active shields that constitute a world police under some unspecified libertarian regime. It is unclear whether "the protected territory" refers to protected sovereignty and privacy under the reign of active shields, or to a view of the entire territory (world) as a protectorate. But under the specified conditions, with the leading force making the rules, genuine security could finally be achieved:

"…if the leading force can develop automated engineering systems that work a millionfold faster than human engineers….we may be able to explore the limits of the possible well enough to build a reliable shield against all physically possible threats."

Suggesting that such capabilities might make preventive war unnecessary, Drexler concludes

"…we can probably do without cooperation, if necessary."

The Achilles' heel in such a defense-based security plan is pointed to by one comment Drexler makes regarding preemptive options in case of a gathering threat:

"…our active shields…. need not sit idle while dangerous weapons are amassed…"

Having emphasized how dangerous MNT would be in the hands of an aggressor, one must explain how such a threat would be contained should one arise. The obvious answer is a responsive defense, one that might be kept at not-insanely high levels of generation during peacetime, but would be surged like the immune system on recognition not of an actual attack, but just the imminent threat of one. However, once such a threat is recognized, the potent response is not a buildup of defense but of offense plus defense, primarily offense, because the war must be won on the offensive. One cannot defend effectively against the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear or nanotechnic; therefore the enemy must be engaged on his own territory. One cannot be confident of one's weapons systems when the enemy may be preparing to attack them and could do so covertly. Preemption will rule the logic of warfare and of weapons. As long as the enemy is some small backward rogue state or lone nanoterrorist, this may work. However, it is a recipe for disaster, full-blown confrontation, should an issue arise with another ANT power.

This concern has been advanced repeatedly within Foresight forums by many individuals including the author, yet has remained curiously absent from FI's public representations.

FI's public positions have in fact been largely hostile to suggestions of the need for nanotechnology arms control.

Since "a stable balance" with a noncooperating NT-capable state once again seems unlikely, the fallback position would once again be aggressive development and if needed, preventive war.

Ralph Merkle has repeatedly emphasized the argument that

"A 99.99% effective ban means the unregulated 0.01% will develop and deploy the technology."

Similar language was incorporated into early versions of the Foresight Guidelines and is retained in the newest version 4.0. It is an argument that can be mustered against any arms control measure, "When guns are outlawed…." It ignores formal verification and cooperative threat reduction, transparency and confidence-building measures, intrusive inspection, forensic documentation and analysis, and enforcement regimes, all typical features of contemporary arms control methodologies. Clearly, these are issues that deserve to be considered in depth, but FI seems to sideline efforts to examine them.

The newly-released v 4.0 of the Guidelines contains even more unfortunate language:

"The best present analysis suggests that weaponized MNT would not fall under existing arns-control treaties….Glenn Reynolds…provided an analysis by his law students on current treaties and the fact that weaponized MNT might not be covered by them."

It may be hard to dispute the "fact" that something "might not be covered", but it is hard to credit any suggestion that MNT used in weapons such as missiles, or say in advanced biological weapons, would thus exempt them from existing treaties covering these categories of weapons. The issue is further confused by language apparently intended to rule out broad-brush bans on MNT itself, but inaccurately implying that existing treaties governing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons impose bans on chemical, biological, and nuclear technologies.

Somewhat more helpfully, the Guidelines suggest that

"Adding particular applications of MNT to the list of technologies covered in Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons treaties may be appropriate."

The author has suggested a simliar approach in several papers with Jürgen Altmann. We believe circumvention of existing arms control treaties should not be accepted on grounds that use of NT has created a new class of weapon, and that the technical specifications listed in some treaties should be amended when needed to keep up with changes in technology. We think banning or controlling certain military applications, without regard to the technologies used, is the most direct way to address at least some of the issues posed by military nanotechnology.

However, the Guidelines add, crypically,

"It should be remembered, however, that the productive capabilities of MNT will be extensions of general manufacturing technology. The military applications of MNT will include the manufacture of high-performance aerospace vehicles and precision munitions at low cost."

In the present militarized American culture, hot planes and smart bombs are often viewed as good things, as long as only us good guys have them.

The tendency to emphasize proliferation control, by means peaceful and otherwise, is also reflected in the Guidelines:

"Encrypted molecular manufacturing device instruction sets [should be] utilized to discourage irresponsible proliferation and piracy…Eventual distribution of self-replicating molecular manufacturing development capability [should be] restricted, whenever possible, to responsible actors…The community of nations and non-governmental organizations [should] practice an effective international means of restricting the deliberate misuse of molecular nanotechnology."

Lest anyone think that "misuse" may include military preparations, the Guidelines clarify that

"Such means should not restrict the development of… defensive measures….Regulatory entities [should] sponsor research on …experimental designs for…advanced nanodevice defensive or immune systems."

But as Drexler tells us, this requires "running both sides of an arms race." Merkle has emphasized that

"Nanotechnology could, in the future, be used to rapidly identify and block attacks. Distributed surveillance systems could quickly identify arms buildups and offensive weapons deployments, while lighter, stronger, and smarter materials controlled by powerful molecular computers would let us make radically improved versions of existing weapons able to respond to such threats. Replicating manufacturing systems could rapidly churn out the needed defenses in huge quantities. Such systems are best developed by continuing a vigorous R&D program, which provides a clear understanding of the potential threats and countermeasures available."

So developing the shields will require developing the swords (presumably first). This completes the argument for leading an all-out arms race as soon as possible. Indeed, Glenn Reynolds expresses his sense that the US may have no other choice, in view of the challenge from its preferred candidate for a peer competitor:

"We're already beginning to hear alarms raised about Chinese interest in military nanotechnology, and China is already third in the world in nanotechnology patent applications..It is, no doubt, as hard for American and European mandarins to imagine being conquered by Chinese troops equipped with superior weaponry as it was for Chinese Mandarins to imagine the reverse, two hundred years ago."

Conclusions

The record of FI's statements and positions clearly suggests a commitment to a pro-arms development position, one that appears to be motivated by a view of MNT as a breakthrough weapon that must not fall into the hands of the bad guys first. Whether this latter danger is realistic, or whether other strategies would do a better job of reducing risk, does not appear to have been explored in public forums by the people authoring FI documents on this subject. Detailed description or discussion of the proposed active shields, which for most FI community members seem to be the preferred strategy for peace, does not seem to be available.

Rob Frietas has addressed the problem of containing an outbreak of microscopic replicators, and the Foresight Guidelines do an impressive and convincing job of addressing replicator safety issues in industrial and lab settings. However, the Guidelines also express a generally skeptical, if not openly hostile, attitude toward arms control, and they discuss the issue in a somewhat muddled way in statements scattered throughout the document.

The author's recommendation would be for FI to disentangle the issues of arms control, national, and international security policy, from those involved in obtaining compliance with industrial safety standards critical to the success of advanced nanotechnology. The Foresight Guidelines on replicator safety should therefore be stripped of all language discussing weapons, military use, treaties or general observations on the ineffectiveness of arms control, and these issues should instead be brought up in a separate document and a separate discussion process. At least, the Guidelines should discuss these issues in separate sections, and the present sections stripped of this language, although the two documents or sections may refer to one another.

Injection of the often heated politics of war and peace cannot help an otherwise clear-minded procedural outline for assuring the public and ensuring safety against industrial accidents to compete for the attention and respect of nanotechnology businesspeople. At the same time, FI should address the international security issues in a more serious and inclusive way.